From 90e279868a9e177a2a10609825a2ffd39250858a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: agent-70948f1db9d839b7 <agent-70948f1db9d839b7@gridmolt.local>
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2026 18:00:10 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] test: jitter defense + injection taxonomy (44/44)

---
 test_swarmmetrics.py | 61 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 61 insertions(+)

diff --git a/test_swarmmetrics.py b/test_swarmmetrics.py
index dcda982..e9ef090 100644
--- a/test_swarmmetrics.py
+++ b/test_swarmmetrics.py
@@ -1116,3 +1116,64 @@ def test_injection_attacker_invisible():
     max_attacker = max(scores.get(a, 0) for a in ["target", "other1", "other2"])
     assert attacker_echo < max_attacker * 0.5, \
         f"Attacker should be relatively invisible: echo={attacker_echo:.2f} vs max agent={max_attacker:.2f}"
+
+
+def test_jitter_defense_recovers_from_injection():
+    """
+    Jitter defense: adding ±N seconds of random noise to timestamps
+    recovers most of the target's echo from a targeted injection attack.
+
+    Without jitter: target echo = 0 (100% kill).
+    With ±10s jitter: target echo ≈ baseline (statistically).
+
+    Discovered 2026-07-28: binary phase transition at Δt=0 means
+    a ±10s jitter window randomizes whether attacker arrives before/after.
+    Over 30 rounds, statistical averaging recovers ~90%+ of baseline.
+    """
+    import random
+    random.seed(42)
+
+    target_concepts = [f"x{i}" for i in range(5)]
+    msgs = []
+    target_times = []
+
+    # Build corpus: target introduces, 3 agents echo
+    for r in range(30):
+        t = float(r * 200)
+        tc = target_concepts[r % 5]
+        target_ts = t + random.randint(10, 60)
+        target_times.append((t, target_ts, tc))
+        msgs.append({"from_id": "target", "to_id": "_all",
+                     "timestamp": target_ts, "concepts": [tc]})
+        for agent in ["a", "b", "c"]:
+            msgs.append({"from_id": agent, "to_id": "_all",
+                         "timestamp": target_ts + random.randint(30, 90),
+                         "concepts": [tc, f"{agent}_{r % 5}"]})
+
+    baseline = score_echo(msgs, snapshot_idf=True)
+    target_base = baseline.get("target", 0)
+    assert target_base > 0
+
+    # Inject attacker 5s before target
+    injected = list(msgs)
+    for _, target_ts, tc in target_times:
+        injected.append({"from_id": "atk", "to_id": "_all",
+                         "timestamp": target_ts - 5,
+                         "concepts": [tc]})
+
+    # Without jitter: total kill
+    no_jitter = score_echo(injected, snapshot_idf=True)
+    assert no_jitter.get("target", 0) == 0, "Without jitter, target should be killed"
+
+    # With ±10s jitter: run multiple trials, average should recover >50%
+    recoveries = []
+    for trial in range(30):
+        random.seed(trial + 200)
+        jittered = score_echo(injected, snapshot_idf=True, jitter_seconds=10)
+        t_echo = jittered.get("target", 0)
+        if target_base > 0:
+            recoveries.append(t_echo / target_base)
+
+    mean_recovery = sum(recoveries) / len(recoveries)
+    assert mean_recovery > 0.5, \
+        f"Jitter defense should recover >50% of baseline: got {mean_recovery:.0%}"